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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

RON DOUGHERTY and JUDITH A.
DOUGHERTY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No. 13854

vs.
CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC UTILITIES
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case is one wherein the plaintiffs, Ron and
Judith A. Dougherty, are seeking a money judgment against
the defendant, California-Pacific Utilities Company, a
public utility, for damages to plaintiffs1 culinary well
and to the basement of their home and for the cost of
hauling culinary water to their home, all of which allegedly resulted from defendant's negligence in allowing water
to overflow the banks of its canal during and following a
severe rain and hailstorm.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiffs judgment against the defendant in the sum and
amount of $896.27 and costs of court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial Court's
judgment on the grounds that the Court erred as follows:
1.

In finding that defendant was negligent in the

maintenance and operation of its canal;
2.

In finding that there was no contributory negligence

on the part of the plaintiffs; and
3.

In finding that defendant's negligence proximately

caused the damage complained of.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, California-Pacific Utilities Company, a
public utility, formerly Southern Utah Power Company, owns,
operates and maintains a hydro electric generating plant
known as hydro plant No. 2, hereinafter referred to as

the

hydro plant, located in close proximity to the Santa Clara
River near Veyo, Washington County, Utah.

The water used to

propel the turbines of hydro plant No. 2 is taken out of the
Santa Clara River at a point upstream from the Baker Reservoir
and conveyed some 3 to 4 miles by means of the No. 2 hydro
canal, hereinafter referred to as the canal, down to the hydro
plant where it runs through the generating plant and eventually
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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back into the Santa Clara River (Tr..

'.

Hydro canal

No, 2 is also owned/ operated and maintained by the defendant
for the purposes aforesaj d.
The canal was built in the year 1919 (Tr. 121) and has
been i n regular use since that date*

It was original] y con-

structed to accommodate the flow of 1 6 cubic feet per second
of water,

The canal had that same carrying capacity at the

time of the damage complained of in this case, as it presently
has (Tr. 6, 90, 96)*

In fact, the diversion works located at

the head of the canal on the Santa Clara River are constructed
in such a fashion as to automatically allow up to a maximum
of 16 second feet of water to enter the canal (Tr. 91, 96).
The company's records indicate that since its construction the canal flov :\ai% wii.e^ • > *i t

-

se *u:

* t,

depending, naturally, ^i: the amount. ;• ." vater flow x:r .icw : tT ^
Santa C] ara R i ver { •

?t)•

ine maximum flow gener?lly occurs

in the spring., that i s, March through Apxi ] , wnxie ~he minimum
flow occurs in July and August (Tr. 92, 93) .
second feet- of wat^r ",

.- • ^r' .

Although 3G

'• ^r-'f-pr'i ated by the defen-

dant for power generating purposes, only : '•-, second feet has
ever been diverted specifically through No. 2 h\ ."::c "anal.
Other por tions of tl la t tota ] appropr > v. \ OP f= i\'*s I <»: >jyod ,
however, in other canals operated by the defendant (Tr. 95, 9 6) .
To achieve the highest possible degree of efficiency in
generating elect r i c i ty, i 1: i s imp o i t ai 11 t h a -

- ~<: i s * an t a m o u n

*Reference is hereby made to particular pages of the transcript of the trial.
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of water pressure be maintained as the water from the canal
reaches the generator (Tr. 10). To that end, the proper
amount of water must be transmitted through the canal to a
forebay which maintains the water at a constant volume and
transmits it down a long steel pipe, known as the penstock,
wherein the proper pressure is achieved by the time the
water reaches the generator.

At least four control devices

aid in achieving the proper pressure and water volume required.
The first device, already referred to above, is at the point
of diversion from the river and automatically allows up to
a maximum of 16 second feet of water into the canal. The
second device, located some considerable distance upstream
from the plaintiffs1 property, is an overflow device and was
installed above a certain point in the canal susceptible to
ice jams.

Said overflow permits water to escape from the

canal at a point where no damage can be done in the event
of an ice jam.

On a very few occasions, the use of said

overflow has been required (Tr. 11, 12, 24). The third
device is located downstream from the plaintiffsf property
and just above the forebay.

It is constructed in such a

fashion that a part of the device can be removed so as to
allow all of the water to overflow harmlessly at that point
in the event the screen in front of the penstock requires
cleaning or if for some other reason it becomes desirable to
prevent the flow of water into the generator.

Said device

also serves the vital function of keeping a constant volume
of 16 second feet of water at the forebay (Tr. 23). In fact,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the canal is so designed that water will overflow automatically at said device (referred to as overflow No, 2 in the
trial transcript) before backing up and overflowing at other
places along the canal, including the vicinity of plaintiffs1
property, if the fourth control device (infra) is completely
shut off (Tr. 135, 159, 160).
The fourth control device is the nozzle at the end of
the penstock.

The nozzle can be shut off completely, but

it can be opened only to one-third capacity, or to an approximate diameter of 10 inches

(Tr. 99). As the volume of the

water in the River and, consequently, in the canal decreases,
such as in the late summer and fall, it is necessary to
decrease the capacity of the nozzle accordingly to maintain
the constant required pressure.
Prior to October, 19 70, the plaintiffs had purchased
approximately a half acre of land immediately east of the
canal at a point approximately 2,000 feet upstream from and
northeast of the forebay.

The plaintiffs moved into a

partially completed home, which they built on the property,
sometime during the latter part of March, 19 71.

They also

completed the drilling of a culinary well, which went into
operation at about the same time.

Both the house and the

well of the plaintiffs were constructed at an elevation well
below that of the portion of the canal adjacent to the plaintiffs1 property.

Plaintiffs were aware before they purchased

the property that it was located on a down-hill slope from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the canal (Tr. 36, 37) .
On August 8, 19 71, a severe rain and hailstorm occurred
in the area through which the canal flows. The storm

was of

such intensity that in a period of approximately two hours,
it deposited one and seventy-two hundredths inches of precipitation in the general area of the canal

(Tr. 15).

Upon receiving word of the occurrence of the severe storm,
Ivan Hunt, hydro foreman for the defendant, rushed to the area.
Upon arrival at the hydro plant, he noticed hail approximately
three inches deep, heavy rains melting the hail, and great quantities of water flooding downhill and into the canal (Tr. 22, 23) .
As a result of the tremendous quantities of flood water running
into the canal from the sloped area west of the canal, water
overflowed the eastern bank of the canal for nearly the entire
length of said bank from the overflow below the plaintiffs1
property to Branham's place above plaintiffs' property —

a

distance of approximately three-tenths to a quarter of a mile
(Tr. 131). However, the bank itself remained intact (Tr. 131).
The only three eyewitnesses to the storm who testified at the
trial, Ivan Hunt, Elwin Hadley (both employees of defendant)
and Ron Dougherty, all described the situation as "water running
everywhere" (Tr. 41, 42, 129, 165).
Immediately prior to the beginning of the storm, the
defendant, Ron Dougherty, left his home and went to Brookside,
approximately one-half mile northeast of his house, to help a
friend start his automobile.

Ron Dougherty testified at trial

that although
the storm was of the same intensity at Brookside
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as at his own home, he waited at Brookside for the storm to
subside rather than returning to his own house immediately
(Tr. 40). Even though he saw great quantities of flood water
running to each side of the road and a considerable amount of
hail still on the ground, he did not pay too much attention
until he got home (Tr. 41). Despite the fact that his culinary
well had lain open and exposed to the elements since late March
of that year (a period of over four months), he "did not pay
too much attention" (Tr. 44, 132, 133). Although Mr. Dougherty
testified that one could expect severe storms in the area of
his house, he had not yet gotten around to sealing and capping
the casing of his well (Tr. 44). The casing was a perforated
type casing, and as of the date of the storm, the area around
the upper part of the casing had remained unfilled.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DAMAGE
COMPLAINED OF RESULTED FROM AN ACT OF GOD, NOT FROM DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE.
(A) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT THE STORM OCCURRING ON AUGUST 8, 1971, WAS AN
UNPRECEDENTED ACT OF GOD, FOR WHOSE CONSEQUENCES
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE.
It is a well-settled rule of law in this state, as well
as in most jurisdictions, that where a canal's overflowing occurs
during a storm of such magnitude

and severity as to be beyond

the realm of reasonable foreseeability, and therefore beyond the
ken of the traditional prudent man, negligence is non-existent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and no liability accrues against the owner of the canal for
damages occurring to others by reason of such overflowing.
Charvoz v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 120 Utah 480 (1951), 235 P.2d
780; Lisonbee v. Monroe Irr. Co., 18 Utah 343, 54 P. 1009 (1898).
Ivan Hunt, the defendant's hydro foreman, who was born
and raised in the area of the hydroplant and canal (Tr. 29),
reported having never before seen a storm in that area of such
severity and magnitude (Tr. 15, 22, 24, 129). He testified, in
fact, that the canal had never before overflowed because of rain
water flowing into the canal (Tr. 130). Ron Dougherty, one of
the plaintiffs, testified that he could not remember a previous
storm in the area delivering a combination of as much rain and
hail (Tr. 42). Jacob Jones, a former employee of the defendant,
whose testimony was the most antagonistic toward the defendant,
and who did not witness the storm (Tr. 70), testified that in
the 2 8 years he had worked along the canal he had never before
seen flooding of the canal at Dougherty's place (Tr. 78).
The record shows that one and seventy-two hundredths inches
of precipitation fell during a period of approximately two hours
(Tr. 15). There is nothing particularly unusual about that amount
of precipitation in that area during a 24-hour period.

The un-

precedented characteristic of that particular storm, however,
is that so much precipitation fell during such a short period
of time.

If that amount of precipitation had come gradually, it

would have been absorbed into the ground.

However, under the

instant circumstances, the ground could not begin to absorb that
excessive quantity of precipitation (Tr. 23).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Courts can distinguish an ordinary flood or storm from
an extraordinary one by determining whether its occurrence
and magnitude should or might have been anticipated by a person
of reasonable prudence in view of the flood and storm history
of the locality involved and existing conditions affecting the
liklihood of flooding.
1952).

Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816, (Oregon

Defendant submits that based on the evidence in the re-

cord and the tests which courts apply in determining what constitutes an act of God, the instant storm and flooding were
unforeseeable and constitute an act of God.
POINT I (B)
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF ITS CANAL.
Utah stands for the proposition that an owner of a canal
is not an insurer against damages caused to others by the overflow of the canal's banks, but that the owner is liable only if
it is negligent in the maintenance or operation of the canal.
Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972); Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Hyland Rlty, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 341,
334 P.2d 755 (1959).

The trial court in the instant case made

a finding that the failure of defendant's agent Ivan Hunt to
reduce the volume of water in the canal by throwing open any or
all of the control devices constitutes negligence of the defendant.

However, the law imposes upon a defendant a duty to act

only under such circumstances where the plaintiff can show by
its proof that damage or harm occurs to the plaintiff as a result of defendant's failure to act.

In the instant case, Ivan

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hunt testified that he had intended to open at least one control
device, but was dissuaded by his judgment that the damage, if
any, had already occurred and that his act of opening the device
would avail little or nothing.

The record is devoid of any

evidence that even if, arguendo, the opening of all the control
devices would have completely drained the canal, such acts of
the defendant would have prevented the damage complained of.

The

plaintiffs have simply failed to carry their burden of showing
that their damage resulted from acts or failure to act on the
part of the defendant.

Even if, arguendo, reasonable minds

could not differ that the complete opening of all the control
devices would have substantially reduced the volume of water in
the canal, one cannot merely assume, under the circumstances
and the proof in this case, that the defendant, therefore,
caused the damage to the plaintiffs.

To sustain such a con-

clusion of the trial court is to relieve the plaintiffs of their
burden of persuasion and to impose upon the defendant a theory
of strict liability or res ipsa loquitur, contrary to the law.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THE PLAINTIFFS
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.
On August 8, 19 71, the defense of contributory negligence
was still a valid defense under Utah law.

The defense was not

supplanted by the comparative Negligence Act until the year 19 73.
Cf. Sections 78-27-37 to -43, U.C.A., (Supp. 1973).
The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiffs knew of the
location of the canal and of the fact that their property was on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a lower elevation than the canal long before they purchased the

property and constructed their house and culinary well (Tr. 36, 37).
However, by Ron Dougherty's own testimony, it is clear that he
did not allow for any danger as to the location of the house and
well (Tr. 38). The evidence further shows that plaintiffs1
culinary well was in operation for a period of some four months
prior to the instant storm and flooding.

Ron Dougherty testified

that he was in the process of sealing the well, but that it had
not yet been completed.

He testified at the trial (Tr. 44) that

one could expect serious storms in his area; however, he had
made little or no effort in four months to protect his well from
the elements. He further testified that he had been told that
some previous flooding had occurred and that a neighbor's rock
work under his trailer had been washed out thereby (Tr. 42).
However, such a report apparently caused him no concern as the
evidence shows that he left his well open and unsealed for four
monthsf time.
On the day of the storm, despite the severity of the rainfall and hail which he observed and the heavy flooding which he
saw, he lingered at a neighbor's house until the storm subsided,
paying no attention to his house or well until he returned home
(Tr. 41) .
A recent Utah case, Erickson v. Bennion, cited supra,
denied recovery to a plaintiff who failed to protect his home
from flooding by run-off waters of the defendant.

The court

imposed a burden upon the plaintiff to provide a means of diverthe Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU. property.
sion of Digitized
the by
flooding
waters
away
from
his
own
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the specific facts of the Erickson case and the instant case
are not identical, the governing principles are. The plaintiffs
in our case, by due diligence, could have prevented the injury
to at least their well, which injury constitutes the substance
of plaintiffs1 complaint.
Both Ivan Hunt and Wallace Smith, defendant's agents,
testified that on the day following the storm plaintiffsf well
was open, unsealed and excavated below the level of the ground
(Tr. 43-45, 94) and susceptible to rain and storm waters. Under
all these circumstances, the trial court's failure to find the
plaintiffs contributorily negligent is reversible error.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF.
The record fails to prove that it was, in fact, the water
that overflowed the canal bank which caused the plaintiffs'
injury, and not the torrential rain and hail storm itself. Had
the canal not existed at all, the evidence is conclusive that
the one and seventy-two hundredths inches of precipitation would
have flowed toward the defendant's property in gushing quantities
anyway.

The plaintiffs' property, lying on a natural slope,

would have been the natural recipient of erronxee^is quantities
of water during that period of approximately two hours that the
storm lasted.

A record devoid of such necessary evidence cannot

support a bare finding that the defendant proximately caused the
injury to the plaintiffs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the appellant respectfully
prays this Court to issue its order:
1.

Reversing the trial court's finding that the defendant

was negligent; or,
2.

Directing the trial court to find the plaintiffs

contributorily negligent; and,
3.

Reversing the trial court's finding that the defendant

proximately caused the damage complained of; and,
4.

Reversing the judgment and decision of the trial court,

Respectfully submitted,

CLINE, JACKSON & MAYER
By Joseph E. Jackson
Attorneys for Appellant
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